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Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of 





We utilise primary data collected from a North Indian village in 2015 to 2016 and examine the 
impact of women’s empowerment on their creditworthiness measured by the total annual loan 
amounts. Our key explanatory variable – an empowerment index – has been constructed using 
four individual-level factors -- economic, social, interpersonal and political. We find that more 
empowered women received greater cumulative loans. We have instrumented empowerment 
by the sex of the borrower’s first child being male. It seems that in the male-dominated 
environment of North India, the ‘luck’ of giving birth to first child as a son helps a woman 
seize opportunities for empowerment.  The village-level finding of empowerment is consistent 
with the result we obtain for the whole of North India using a separate and national dataset. 
We also show that for the rest of India education, but not empowerment, is an important 
determinant of loan volumes.  
 
JEL Classification Nos: J16; C23; C36; G20; O17 
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Creditworthiness has been an integral part of the women’s empowerment narrative of 
microfinance since the introduction of the Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh in 1983. 
Millions of poor women have benefitted from microfinance throughout the world and, in the 
process, have also been empowered (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley, 1996; Kabeer, 2001; Pitt 
and Khandker, 1996), although in some cases disempowerment has also taken place from 
failures to repay, over-indebtedness and loss of control over the loan (Garikipati, 2008; Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996; Guérin, Kumar, and Agier, 2013)  By and large, the microfinance literature 
has viewed empowerment more of an outcome (see for instance, Kabeer, 1999, 2005; Mayoux, 
1998) than a determinant of creditworthiness.  
 
But there is no denying that empowerment is a process. It takes place over time by gaining 
independence and taking control of personal, social and financial decisions (Hashemi, Schuler, 
and Riley, 1996). While borrowing leads to greater empowerment (Mayoux, 1998), 
empowerment could also lead to further loans. So, empowerment is both a cause of and an 
effect on loan behaviours. Here, we focus on the former. We aim to analyse how female 
empowerment affects their volume of loans, by studying a primary field survey data from a 
village in the state of Haryana, Northern India in combination with data from India Human 
Development Survey (IHDS)1.  
 
For the benefit of discussion, we define the volume and sustenance of loans as measures of 
creditworthiness, although in the literature it is the eligibility of getting loans that is commonly 
viewed as creditworthiness. The question of empowerment being a determinant of 
creditworthiness is likely to be of special importance for regions like rural North India where 
women have been historically disadvantaged. The region systematically lags in every gender 
development metric (Government of India, 2015). Even the microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
which have proliferated in the rest of India, have struggled to build a female clientele in 
Northern India. 
 
In such an environment, a key consideration for lenders is likely to be woman’s 
independence, mobility, and control over their own resources. Local money-lenders and village 
                                                 
1 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative survey produced by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi, and the University of Maryland.  
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credit co-operatives (called co-operative societies) have the necessary background information 
on the borrowers - but MFIs do not. However, group lending (as in the Grameen model) ensures 
that the borrowers select their peers wisely considering their risk attitudes and financial 
independence.  
   
We study female borrowers of three MFIs, a co-operative society and several local lenders 
in a randomly selected village of Haryana over two years (2015 and 2016). All loans were for 
production purposes. The village had no MFI before 2014. All three MFIs follow the Grameen 
model consisting of five-member groups. Upon completing 50 per cent of the repayment, a 
borrower becomes eligible to apply for a second loan, which is typically a bigger amount 
(Section 2 gives more details). We consider the total annual borrowing for each borrower. The 
MFIs vary in terms of the loan amount and the repayment cycle.  
 
The borrowers are low-income women, all having children. They are engaged in activities 
like livestock rearing, pottery, candle making and other small informal businesses. We have 
collected data on their economic status, purchasing power, mobility, political awareness, 
attitude to domestic violence, and control over assets and income. These data are then used to 
construct an empowerment index using the principal component analysis (PCA) methodology 
(Sharaunga,  Mudhara, and Bogale, 2016). We then regress the log of loan on the empowerment 
index, along with a set of controls. We find that the loan amount is positively and significantly 
related to the empowerment index.  
 
However, the empowerment variable might be affected by the loans taken in the past or 
might be correlated with some of the control variables. We therefore instrument the 
empowerment variable. Our choice of instrument is the borrower’s first child being a boy, 
which is entirely a random event. The child’s sex should not directly affect the loan amounts 
that the mother would get in future. But in an environment where son preference is culturally 
ingrained, giving birth to a son can elevate a young woman’s status within the household and 
help her gain some independence. This is the rationale we use to justify our instrument. 
 
Our first stage regression of the two stage least square (2SLS) model shows that the first 
child’s sex (male) is a strong determinant of mother’s empowerment. The second stage 
instrument variable (IV) estimate shows that an exogenous increase in empowerment increases 
the loan amount. It also shows that the husband’s income does not affect the loan outcomes of 
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the women. Therefore, we argue that empowerment has a positive causal effect on 
creditworthiness. 
 
As said above, a child’s sex can affect the mother’s present social status. Indian households 
are known to exhibit son preference (Das Gupta et al., 2003; Dyson and Moore, 1983), and this 
preference is stronger in rural areas for reasons of bequest, religious traditions and marriage 
dowry (Bardhan, 1988; Das Gupta et al., 2003; Mutharayappa, 1997).2 Women who have given 
birth to a girl may be ill-treated by their in-laws families (Jejeebhoy, 1997). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that mothers of boys may be given some independence and control over 
their own lives.3  
 
It is noteworthy that for our IV we have used the sex of the first child, but not the second 
or the third child, or even the total number of sons. The reason is to avoid possible gender 
manipulation. Sex selective abortion is believed to be widespread in India, but researchers 
show that this occurs predominantly with the second pregnancy onward, conditional on the 
first child being a girl (Das Gupta et al. 2003; Rosenblum, 2013). Aborting the first child is 
very rare and unlikely (Arnold, Choe, and Roy, 1998; Jha et al. 2011).4 
 
Is our empowerment model too specific to be applicable elsewhere? We test the robustness 
of our methodology using the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) data of 2011-12, for 
North India5 and the rest of India. Although the households covered by the IHDS survey are 
not comparable to the ones in our village survey, the dataset is very helpful for our purpose of 
studying empowerment because it contains both loan information and women’s empowerment 
related information. However, it also has two major limitations. First, the loan information 
pertains to the household level, but not individual members of the household. Second, the data 
                                                 
2 The sons also maintain family names and inherit family wealth (Das Gupta et al., 2003, Mutharayappa et al., 
1997), and by the Hindu religious rules, males are responsible for performing various family rites, for instance in 
the event of death (Mutharayappa et al., 1997). Most importantly, by the Hindu social custom, at the time of 
marriage the groom’s family receives dowry - a substantial transfer in the form of wealth (like gold, land, durable 
goods and cash) - from the bride’s family. Therefore, having a male child strengthens the social status of the 
household (Dyson and Moore 1983). Anecdotes of respite from domestic abuse or forfeiting dowry claims after 
giving birth to a boy are quite common.    
3 There is no evidence to suggest that grown up boys could have been used as an implicit collateral.  
4 Abortions are generally expensive and dangerous (15 to 20 percent deaths are caused due to unsafe abortions) 
(Duggal, 2004, Jha et al. 2011) and could negatively affect the reproductive health of women. First child is also 
seen as god's gift in the region. So, abortion is deemed as an act against god wishes.  
5 North India consist of the following ten states: Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Chandigarh and Jammu and Kashmir 
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give the total number of boys and girls in the family, but not their birth order, which means we 
cannot use the same IV. To address these limitations, we separate those households that are 
listed as female-headed, relying on the assumption that the head of the household is responsible 
for the loans. We then construct the empowerment index for this subsample using the same 
PCA method, as done from our village survey data. Since the first child’s sex cannot be used 
as IV from this dataset, we use widowhood as the IV for empowerment, and we find that 
empowerment does have a causal effect on the amount of loans in North India, but not in the 
rest of India.  
 
Widowhood as an IV can be explained as follows. First, it is a random occurrence. Second, 
the absence of husband allows (and necessitates) a woman to be independent and to make 
strategic life choices6. That said, it is also true that widows in India are amongst the most 
vulnerable sections of society. Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) have shown that widows in India 
face severe intra-household discrimination. Therefore, expecting widowhood to contribute to 
empowerment is self-contradictory. Our argument is that when a widow suffers economic 
misfortune, we would expect them to take on greater consumption loans, but not non-
consumption loans. The IHDS data contain information on consumption loans, as well as 
production, education and medical loans. We see that widows take a slightly larger amount of 
loan on average, but the difference between widows and non-widows is statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, we reconcile empowerment and vulnerability by arguing that probably 
widows are less likely to receive non-consumption loans. But amongst those women who get 
these loans, widows are likely to be more empowered than non-widows7.  
 
Indeed, our IV analysis shows that widowhood enables women to be more empowered and 
loans empowerment has a causal positive effect on non-consumption loans. This argument 
holds true for our North India subsample, which is consistent with our finding from the village 
data. We also show with the IHDS data that empowerment positively affects the probability of 
getting loans. 
 
But can the same be said about the whole of India? To answer the above question, we run 
the exact same model for the rest of India, and the IV estimates show that empowerment does 
                                                 
6 In our female-headed household sub-sample of the IHDS data, widows have control over the household resources 
and 96 percent of them reported supports received from their natal and/or in-law families.  
7 In fact, our IHDS data show that widows were more empowered regardless of they took loans or not. 
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not have a causal effect on the loan amount. In fact, it is education that becomes a strong 
determinant of loan amount. We also check that empowerment does not determine the women’s 
access to loans in the rest of India. Although it seems puzzling, it can be explained in terms of 
the much higher status of women in Southern and North Eastern India. Thus, empowerment, 
as measured by our factors, is not critical for creditworthiness in the rest of India; instead, 
human capital is, as it should also be for a male borrower.  
 
    In sum, our paper makes the following contributions. First, we construct an empowerment 
index taking an array of factors into account both at a village level and regional levels. The 
index allows us to study empowerment as a determinant of creditworthiness. Second, while 
studying the individual contributions of the underlying factors of empowerment, we find that 
some factors like the women’s control over assets, income and savings, their political 
awareness, and their attitude to domestic violence seem to be extremely important. Third, the 
empowerment process may be triggered by good luck (like giving birth to a son) or by personal 
tragedy (like widowhood). In the highly male-dominated environment of North India, either 
factor can help empower a woman and advance her creditworthiness. Elsewhere in India, 
human capital is much more critical for creditworthiness. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and study area. Section 3 
describes the construction of the empowerment index. Section 4 sets out the methodology for 
the paper. Section 5 reports the econometric results and Section 6 tests the robustness of the 
results. The concluding section discusses some limitations. 
 
2. The study area and the data 
 
The study covered a random sample of 211 women who were clients of three MFIs, a co-
operative society, and several professional money lenders. The data were collected through 
two household surveys taken in 2015 and 2016 (see the timeline of the survey in Figure 1 in 
Appendix), in a village in the state of Haryana, North India (see the map in Figure 2 in 
Appendix). We collected information regarding income, loans, investment, health, household 
composition, education, employment, assets, and other variables. In addition, we held informal 
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discussions8 and semi-structured interviews9 to select the variables that constituted the 
empowerment index.  
 
The village is 90 km away from the state capital, with 1143 households and a population of 
6466, of whom 3420 are males while 3046 are females as per the Population Census 2011. 
Haryana is a relatively prosperous state with only 11% of the population living below the 
poverty line, but the state has the worst gender ratio in India - 879 girls for 1,000 males as 
compared to the national average of 917 girls for 1,000 males. The average literacy rate of 
Haryana is 76 %; male literacy stands at 84 % while female literacy is at 66 %, not far off from 
the national average. Hinduism is the main religion of the state with 87.46 % classified as 
Hindu. The state is also very agricultural with 65.12 % of of people living in rural areas. The 
village is in a fast-growing area with good transportation links and is endowed with a good 
irrigation system. The area is a low risk for natural disasters such as earthquake or floods. 
 
The credit market of the village is served by three MFIs since 2014, named SKS (now 
known as Bharat Financial Inclusion Limited), Utkarsh, and Janlaxmi. Additionally, there are 
several moneylenders and a government supported co-operative society. The moneylenders, 
locally called aadthis, also double as traders in crops and agricultural inputs.  
 
Most women in our sample are self-employed earning less than two dollars a day from their 
household businesses which are livestock farming, growing vegetables, garment making and 
other small businesses10 (see Table 1).  None of the businesses are registered with the 
government or have any permanent employees. 
 




                                                 
8 We attended weekly and monthly meetings of microfinance institutions and used them to discuss 
empowerment with the women participants.  
9 The interviews were done with 15 women representing various age groups at their houses in the presence of a 
local social worker who helped with translation and conversations. The permission to interview women was 
obtained from them as well as from the head of the village (sarpanch). Consent was taken in verbal form. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured approach, giving participants the flexibility to discuss issues important to 
them. All the clients approached agreed to be interviewed for this study. 
10 Our sample consist of self-employed women who have taken loans for productive purposes. Most businesses 




Garment making 11.37 
Shops 17.54 
Small informal businesses (pottery, candle, 




All three MFIs use a version of the Grameen model. Borrowers are asked to form a group 
of five, and then the group members are expected to monitor each other’s repayment as well as 
coordinate some activities (such as collection of repayment) to reduce the operational costs of 
the MFI. However, they all can receive, as well as repay, the loan at the same time (instead of 
taking turns). Eligibility to receive a second loan depends on both the individual and the group 
repayment record. As already noted, repayment of 50 percent dues makes one eligible for a 
second loan. The group is expected to meet every week or month (depending on their 
repayment cycle) for a short meeting when the members pay their dues and pledge honesty and 
timely repayment. We did not see any default or expulsion of a member from any group. 
 
There is some difference between the MFIs in terms of the repayment cycle. The repayment 
cycle of SKS is weekly, which starts within a week of the loan disbursement. Janlaxmi and 
Utkarsh use a monthly cycle of repayment, which starts after a month of the loan disbursement. 
SKS and Utkarsh have similar loan products where a new borrower starts with a loan limit of 
Rs 15,000, which is then increased by an additional Rs 15,000 in the second loan cycle, and 
then by Rs 20,000 in the third loan cycle, and finally by Rs 30,000 in the fourth until to reach 
the overall cap of Rs 80,00012. For Janlaxmi, the first loan starts at Rs 30,000 and the second 
loan can go up to Rs 50,000. The repayment is collected by a loan officer during the 
weekly/monthly meeting of the group and a record is kept in individual borrower’s passbooks. 
 
The co-operative society and traders are very flexible with their loan amount and repayment 
cycle. Usually, a co-operative loan is to be paid back within six months with agreed instalments 
subject to some adjustments in difficult times, but failure to repay the loan on time invites 
higher interest charges on the outstanding amount and/or being barred from future loans. Loans 
                                                 
11 Including joint investments with husbands, trading of pulses, utensils, chemicals etc. 
12 1$= Rs 70 (September 2018) 
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from traders are highly flexible and their interest rates are usually the same as the MFIs. All 
loans are for productive purposes; some are predictably seasonal.  
 
Table 2: Loan products offered by various lenders: 
Lender Repayment Schedule Interest rate 
per annum 
Repayment Initial loan 
SKS   Weekly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 335 over the 
course of 54 weeks/one year 
18-22 % Weekly  Rs 15000 
Utkarsh  Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1480 over the 
course of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly  Rs 15000 
Janlaxmi Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1930 over the 
course of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly  Rs 30000 
Co-operative 
Society 
Flexible repayment amount paid 
within six months 
15-22 % Flexible  Varies 
Traders/local 
lenders 
Depends on the relationship and 
negotiation with the lender  
20-50 % Flexible  Varies 
 
The study focuses on the creditworthiness of the women borrowers which is measured by the 
cumulative amount of loan taken each year. Therefore, the main dependent variable is the log 
of total loan taken at the time of the survey. The descriptive statistics of the participants at 
baseline are provided in Table 3. The average borrower in our sample is 31.77 years old who 
has completed 5.5 years of education and lived in the village for 12 years. In 2015, she had a 
total loan (from all sources) of Rs 30,540, earned an annual income of Rs 35,810, and saved 
Rs 690 in the last month. They also owned assets worth of Rs 101,560. In 2016, the average 
loan size fell to Rs 21,350, and the annual income increased to Rs 42,280 leading to a 
significant increase in the last month saving to Rs 1,209. The decline in the loan could be due 
to the possibility that some borrowers were reaching their MFI loan cap, and/or their optimal 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 2015 2016 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
Income and expenditure (‘000 Rs)     
Loan taken in the year  30.54 13.77 21.35 9.591 
Assets worth  101.6 51.42 110.8 44.99 
Income of the respondent 35.81 12.38 42.28 10.03 
Income of the household 124.4 29.24 134.7 25.09 
Level of investment in business activities 39.21 30.71 24.08 8.766 
Borrower’s savings per month  0.692 0.474 1.209 0.831 
Household consumption on food per month13 3.404 1.049 3.919 0.918 
Average working hours per week 31.98 12.52 35.29 10.53 
Expenditure on children education 0.695 2.433 0.725 2.426 
Expenditure on health 16.38 12.41 15.20 7.611 
Expenditure on entertainment in the last month14 1.012 0.356 1.000 0.292 
 
Borrower’s characteristics 
    
Age (years) 31.77 4.913   
Age at marriage 19.60 1.686   
Years in the village 12.14 4.968   
Education years 5.526 3.129   
No of sons 1.294 0.585   
No of daughters 1.147 0.571   
First child son 0.672 0.472   
Size of the household 5.014 0.771   
No of working members 2.28 0.53   
House Quality15 0.578 0.495   
  
Share of the lending institutions in loans      
                                                 
13 Consumption expenditure on food calculated by average monthly spending on rice, flour, milk and dairy 
products, pulses, vegetables, oil and spices. 
14 Expenditure on entertainment includes spending on cable TV, mobile, fairs, festivals, and picnics 
15 A binary variable distinguishing between dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented 




Cooperative 0.0758 0.265   
Traders/local lenders 0.137 0.345   
Janlaxmi 0.0711 0.258   
SKS 0.474 0.501   
Utkarsh 0.242 0.429   
     
Borrower’s caste     
Other Backward Castes (OBC) 0.308 0.463   
General Caste 0.251 0.435   
Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribes (SC/ST) 0.441 0.498   
     
 
3. Empowerment index 
 
Although women's empowerment is a much-researched topic in development economics, 
there is no universally agreed definition of the term (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005)16. For 
example, Sen (1993, as cited in Malhotra and Schuler, 2005) viewed empowerment as “altering 
relations of power which constrain women’s options and autonomy and adversely affect health 
and well-being”. Keller and Mbwewe (1991, as cited in Rowlands, 1995) defined it as “a 
process whereby women become able to organize themselves to increase their own self-
reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources which will 
assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination”.  
 
We take the definition adopted by Kabeer (1999:437). According to her, “empowerment is 
the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability 
was previously denied to them”. The ability needs to improve on three inter-related dimensions: 
resources (access to and claims over material, human and social resources), agency (processes 
of decision making), and achievements (well-being outcomes). Following this 
conceptualisation, we consider the following four dimensions: economic, social, interpersonal 
and political.   
 
                                                 
16 The literature has used several concepts like autonomy, power status and agency interchangeably (Malhotra 
and Schuler, 2005). 
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Economic empowerment: Economic empowerment alters the economic relationship 
between a woman and her immediate environment.  Within the family unit, it reduces the extent 
to which women are financially dependent on other family members, and consequently may 
improve her status in the family along with increased inter-spousal consultations in household 
matters (Kabeer, 2001). Women’s control over economic resources such as loans, income and 
savings contribute to the process of economic empowerment. 
 
To assess women’s agency vis-à-vis income, savings and loans we asked them about how 
much control they have over these resources. We also asked them about the freedom to 
participate in the labour market, and freedom to buy certain things such as cooking utensils 
(costing below Rs 5,000) and furniture or jewellery (costing above Rs 5,000)17.   
 
Clearly, economic empowerment is important in enlarging the set of economic options, 
but it alone may not necessarily improve a woman’s life. A woman also needs confidence and 
social skills to translate the options into practical actions. Malhotra and Schuler (2005) argue 
that it takes at least three-pronged empowerment - social, political and economic - to enable 
real change in women's welfares.  
 
Social empowerment: Mobility is a widely used indicator of women’s empowerment. It is 
especially important in the highly male-controlled environments of North India. To assess 
women’s mobility in the public domain, we asked whether the respondent was free to move 
within the village to visit temple or friends without her husband’s permission. We also asked 
if she could travel alone outside the village for family-related matters or medical needs.  
 
The concept of social empowerment is crucially linked to women's access to public spaces 
and mobility in the community and beyond.  To develop and maintain their position within a 
community, women must be able to engage socially - for example by attending meetings and 
community events, and by forming their own network. This will improve their social trust, 
access to public information and abilities to influence the social norms, which ultimately yield 
strategic benefit for the society (Kabeer, 2001).  
 
                                                 
17 The rupee limits were imposed after consulting with women to identify which level of asset ownership was 
sufficient for sustainable economic empowerment.   
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Interpersonal empowerment: Empowerment is a process of internal change, that focuses 
on a woman's sense of belief in her own decision-making abilities. Attitudes and perceptions 
reflect internal transformation and empower women from ‘within’ (Kabeer, Mahmud, and 
Tasneem, 2011). We asked questions on their attitude towards domestic violence and their 
ability to decide on family planning and children’s (especially daughters’) schooling, and to 
decide on sales/purchases of livestock. We asked a question regarding women’s health to 
account for the physical condition needed for them to act upon the available opportunity. We 
also accounted for media exposure through access to TV and radio. 
 
Political empowerment: Since there was an election held around the time of our first 
survey, we included some questions relating to political awareness. We asked them about their 
knowledge of the elected representative and if they had voted independently of their husband’s 
preference. Political awareness is a proxy for women’s understanding of their rights to fair 
wages and prices, social justice, and lawful treatments by the police or government officials.  
 
Table 4 enlists the variables and corresponding data that will be used in our PCA to construct 
the empowerment index. 
 
Table 4: Indicators of empowerment 
Economic 
status/security 
• Owns assets above Rs 10000 (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Free to choose between staying home or participating in employment 
activities (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Control over loan 
 
• Full control (1) 
• Share loan with husband (0.5) 
• No control (0) 
Control over income 
and savings 
• Have control over their savings and income (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Purchasing capacity 
 
• Control over small purchases > Rs 5000 such as food, children 
products, cooking utensils and own clothes (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Control over big purchases < Rs 10000 such as furniture/Jewellery 
(Yes =1, No = 0) 
14 
 
Decision making: • Have a say in sale and purchase of livestock/ /housing equipment (Yes 
=1, No = 0) 
• Independent or have the majority control in taking decisions regarding 
child/daughter schooling, clothing, and food (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Mobility 
 
• Free to move around the village such as visit the temple or friends 
without husband’s objection (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Free to move outside village to doctors, relative or market, without 
husband’s objection to going alone (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Participation in public 
life 
• Free to participate in the microfinance project/ attending meetings/ 
forming a group/ public life (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Political awareness 
 
• Know the name of their Sarpanch (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Know the name of their MLA/MP (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Voted in the election/will vote in the election (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Independent of husband interference in the voting (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Attitude towards 
domestic violence 
• Is it wrong for a husband to beat his wife in any situation? (Agree =1, 
Disagree = 0) 
Family Planning • Independent to take fertility and parenting decisions (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Media exposure • Access to radio, TV, and other sources of media (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Health self-evaluation 
 
• Generally healthy (1) 
• Occasionally sick (0.5) 
• Poor Health (0) 
 
Before we proceed to the PCA model of the index construction, we need to accept certain 
limitations of our methodology. First, admittedly empowerment is a latent construct and at best 
we can only get an approximate estimate relying on some key, but not all, aspects of 
empowerment. For example, a woman may have the freedom to work, but will still not be able 
to work if she lacks confidence or necessary skills. Economic empowerment, in this instance, 
does not translate into economic agency. Second, women’s empowerment in certain context 
could also lead to disempowerment. For instance, social empowerment demands that women 
have greater visibility, mobility and engagement in their communities. Depending on the 
strength of cultural and religious norms in those communities, this could expose women to 
social hostility or even violence. Similarly, greater participation in economic activities by 
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women could discourage other family members - especially men - from working and burden 
the women with more economic responsibility as well as household responsibility. Therefore, 
an additional care is needed to construct an empowerment index or scale due to its multi-
dimensionality since combining inappropriate variables to measure empowerment could lead 
to its incorrect and inefficient estimation. Third, cultural and behavioural norms are likely to 
vary across space and time. A measure that signifies empowerment in one region or culture 
may have little relevance or different meaning in another. This is particularly evident in the 
case of measuring freedom of mobility which is more relevant in a patriarchal religious context 
where women are expected to remain at home than in a western context. Thus, consistency and 
comparability remain an issue. This is not unique to empowerment, but common to all 
qualitative variables.    
 
Developing a universal measure of empowerment is beyond the scope of this paper. We 
accept the limitations mentioned above. We have taken utmost care to develop an 
empowerment index based on a series of factors that are relevant to the region, which were 
uncovered through one-to-one conversations with women and our own knowledge of the North 
Indian reality. For example, our informal discussions also suggested that good health of a 
woman is also important for empowerment because she would otherwise be regarded as a 
family burden. We therefore included a separate question on health.  
 
Principal Component Analysis. We use the statistical procedure of principal components to 
determine the weights for an index of the variables mentioned above. PCA is a multivariate 
statistical procedure used to reduce the number of variables in a data set into a smaller number 
of components so that variations in the data can be accounted with the greatest accuracy (Vyas 
and Kumaranayake, 2006). PCA transforms original variables into uncorrelated indices, where 
each component is a linear weighted combination of the original variables.  
 
Using a set of variables (X1 , X2,…, Xn), m principal components can be expressed as  
 
PC1 = a11X1 + a12X2 +…… + a1nXn 
PC2 = a21X1 + a22X2 +…… + a2nXn 
…… 




where aij represents the weight for the i-th principal component and the j-th variable. 
 
The variance for each principal component is measured by the eigenvalue of the 
corresponding eigenvector. All components are uncorrelated, and they are ordered in 
accordance with their additional information content, starting from the largest. The first 
principal component captures the largest amount of information that is common to all of the 
variables, subject to the constraint that the sum of the squared weights is equal to one (Filmer 
and Pritchett, 1998; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The second component explains 
additional but less variation in the original variables than the first component subject to the 
same constraint. The last component will account for the least amount of variations in the 
original variables. PCA works in such a way that variables with low standard deviation would 
carry a low weight. For instance, if every woman in our sample has a TV in her house; 
exhibiting no variation between household, then the variable would be zero weighted and 
would be of little use in estimating the index. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables used in computing empowerment index 




Small purchases 0.991 0.050 0.995 0.065  
 (0.097)  (0.068)  
Big purchases 0.692 0.238 0.834 0.220 
 (0.097)  (0.068)  
Mobility in the village 0.924 0.151 0.962 0.157 
 (0.265)  (0.191)  
Mobility outside the village 0.275 0.122 0.374 0.143 
 (0.448)  (0.485)  
Know the name of the village head 0.991 0.192 0.991 0.194 
 (0.0971)  (0.0971)  
Voted in the recent election 0.919 0.466 0.924 0.449 
 (0.273)  (0.265)  
Know the name of the MLA/MP 0.858 0.455 0.858 0.442 
 (0.350)  (0.350)  
0.0711 0.142 0.0806 0.134 
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Note: Factor scores are based on the first principal component. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
The first principal component explains 17% of the variation in the variables used; this 
percentage is substantial but not overwhelming18. Table 5 presents the factor score from the 
first principal component which shows that our index gives more weight to economic status, 
control over savings, political awareness, attitude towards domestic violence and purchasing 
capacity regarding expensive items. Since every woman in our sample has access to TV/radio, 
the variable of media exposure would have no effect on our index. We will now examine how 
empowerment affects the amount of loan.  
                                                 
18 Although the first principal component may well serve as a reasonable overall index, the question remains 
whether this component has all the relevant information (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998). 
Independent of husband interference in the 
voting 
(0.258)  (0.273)  
Self-employed or participate in the labour 
market 
0.995 0.173 0.995 0.196 
(0.0688)  (0.0688)  
Owns asset above INR 10000 0.858 0.310 0.858 0.322 
 (0.350)  (0.350)  
Control over savings and income 0.976 0.365 0.976 0.388 
 (0.152)  (0.152)  
Independent in taking household decision 
regarding food, children’s education etc 
0.883 0.123 0.967 0.112 
(0.323)  (0.180)  
Have a say in purchasing livestock and 
household equipment 
0.708 0.254 0.664 0.226 
(0.455)  (0.474)  
Free to participate in the microfinance project/ 






Control over loan 0.614 0.038 0.654 0.0166 
 (0.373)  (0.373)  
Media exposure 1  1  
 (0)  (0)  
Is wife beating justified in any situation? 0.566 0.244 0.573 0.243 
(0.339)  (0.339)  
Independent to take fertility and parenting 
decisions 
 
0.0806 0.135 0.0806 0.146 






To estimate the relationship between women’s empowerment and their creditworthiness, a 
model in the following form is employed. 
 
ln (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛿𝛿1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ……………. (1) 
where i = 1,2,…, 211, t =1,2.  
 
Here, ln (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is the log of volume of loans for the i-th women in the sample at year t. 
EMPOWERMENT is the total empowerment score; Yij is a vector of the borrower’s individual 
and household characteristics, such as age, education years, caste, and months with the lender, 
household size and source of the loan.  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  is an individual specific unobservable effect, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is 
year fixed effect and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an iid error term.  
 
To identify which empirical methodology - pooling, fixed effects or random effects model 
- is most appropriate, we perform two statistical tests: the first is the Hausman specification 
test (Hausman, 1978) to compare the fixed effect and the random effect models; the second is 
the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) of the random effect model (see 
Table 15 in the Appendix for fixed effects and random effects estimates). A rejection of null 
hypothesis in the Hausman test statistic would imply that the random effects estimators are 
inconsistent and that fixed effects estimates are more appropriate. In our case, the Hausman 
specification test failed to reject null hypothesis (χ2(5) = 10.21) and suggests support for the 
random effects model. A LM test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals can 
be used to assess whether the Panel GLS model is appropriate than the strict OLS model. The 
Lagrange multiplier failed to reject the null hypothesis allowing us to conclude that the random 
effects model is not appropriate. Therefore, we run a simple pooled OLS regression. 
 
However, EMPOWERMENT can be dependent on the loan as well as other omitted 
variables. We address this potential endogeneity bias by adopting the IV approach and using 
sex of the first child as an instrument for empowerment. In the 2SLS IV approach, our first 
stage treats empowerment index as a dependent variable and use dummy variables for the first 
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child being son as an independent variable. In the second stage, we regress log of loan amount 
on the predicted value of empowerment index obtained from the first stage regression.  
 
Indeed, our first stage regression shows that our instrument is a strong determinant of 
mother’s empowerment. The second stage regression shows that (instrumented) empowerment 
increases the loan amount. Therefore, we can argue that empowerment has a positive causal 
effect on creditworthiness.   
 
Now we need to explain our choice of the instrument. Whether the first child is a boy or a 
girl is purely a random event and could not directly affect the loan amounts the mother would 
get many years later. Can the first child’s sex be manipulated through sex-selective abortion, 
given that India, and North India particularly, show strong son preference? The answer to this 
question, based on overwhelming evidence, is ‘no’. Das Gupta et al. (2003) and Rosenblum 
(2013) show that the chance of sex-selective abortion arises predominantly with the second 
pregnancy onward, when the first child was a girl. Aborting the first pregnancy is very rare and 
unlikely (Arnold, Choe, and Roy, 1998; Jha et al. 2011), not to mention the health 
consequences associated with it. Moreover, in rural Haryana first child is also seen as God’s 
gift and terminating pregnancy would be regarded as a sin. But the second or third child’s 
gender selection is not uncommon. Because of this risk of non-randomness arising with later 
children, we took only the first child (being boy) as our instrument, and not total number of 
sons. In fact, when we tried total number of sons as an alternative instrument, we saw no 
relationship between the instrument and empowerment. 
 
Now what would be the economic explanation for the significantly positive relationship 
between giving birth to a boy (as first child) and empowerment? We argue that in the male-
dominated culture of North India, where women are ill-treated for giving birth to a girl for the 
costly future implications of dowry (among other reasons), the luck of giving birth to a son 
would elevate a young woman’s status within the household (Jejeebhoy, 1997). She might be 
granted significant freedom in decision making and control over basic resources in her life. 
These are important steps in gaining independence and self-confidence in later life.  
 
We may also argue that the luck of giving birth to two or three sons does not improve things 
dramatically, because the pathway to empowerment already opened due to the first son; gaining 
further empowerment has nothing to do with having additional sons. That is the reason the total 
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number of boys does not work as an instrument. Similarly, giving birth to a boy after a girl 
does not also help much either, because it can only prevent deterioration of the woman’s status. 
Likewise, giving birth to a girl after a boy may not be a great misfortune, given that the family 
already got a son they value so much. Thus, the first child being a boy is crucial.    
  
Is it possible that a boy could be an implicit collateral or loan guarantor and thus can directly 
influence the loans? This is not plausible on several grounds. First, the loans are also very short 
term, which cannot be renegotiated for delayed repayment from a son’s future income. In any 
case, MFIs or cooperative societies, who are the dominant sources of loan in our sample, do 
not follow such exploitative policies. Second, the average woman’s age is about 32 years and 
the age at which she had her first child was 21. So, having an eleven years old son cannot help 




Our OLS and IV estimates are reported in Table 6. We see that both models show 
significant positive effects of empowerment on the loan amount. The underlying first stage 
regression of the IV model, presented in Table 11 in Appendix, show that the first-born son 
leads to 1.33 unit increase in women’s empowerment and the relationship is significant at 1% 
level. Therefore, it is seen that having a first-born son contributes directly to women’s 
experiences of empowerment. The number of education years completed also have a positive 
and significant relationship with empowerment.  
 
The IV estimates show that for a unit increase in empowerment score, the loan amount is 
expected to increase by 12.8 percent (Column 2, Table 6)20. The number of education years 
completed has a negative impact on the amount of loan - probably because microfinance is 
usually taken by less educated women and higher educated women are more likely to work in 
regular salaried jobs. The positive and significant coefficient of upper caste suggests that caste 
phenomena are strong in the region and upper caste women are expected to get a higher loan 
amount. Husband’s income does not appear to have any effect on the loan amount which 
                                                 
19 To test the validity of this argument, we have regressed the loan amount on the interaction of the first-child 
dummy and mother’s age. The interaction term is insignificant. 
20 We found no evidence of reverse causality with loan amount having no effect on the level of empowerment.  
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suggests women own status determines their loan outcomes21. We find that the number of 
working members, house quality (as a proxy for income), average hours worked per week and 
years in the village do not affect the amount of loan. The coefficients of the loan sources other 
than SKS MFI (which is the base category) are negative. Women involved in livestock and 
other business activities such as joint investments with husbands, trading of pulses, utensils, 
and chemicals have a higher loan amount compared to the women engaged in agriculture 
activities. 
 
Table 6: Pooled OLS and IV estimation model  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS IV 
   
Empowerment 0.035* 0.128*** 
 (0.021) (0.045) 
Education years -0.008 -0.033** 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Months with the lender 0.122*** 0.119*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
Months with the lender square -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of working members 0.068 0.056 
 (0.056) (0.059) 
Upper Caste 0.115 0.160** 
 (0.073) (0.078) 
House quality -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.063) (0.061) 
Average hours worked per week 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of husband’s income 0.199 0.099 
                                                 
21 We found that wife’s income is a strong determinant of the loan amount without changing our main results, 
but for endogeneity reasons, we have not included it in our final regression. 
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 (0.125) (0.112) 
Source of the loan   
Utkarash -0.077 -0.122* 
 (0.051) (0.064) 
Janlaxmi 0.206*** 0.132 
 (0.075) (0.096) 
Moneylenders -0.123 -0.151 
 (0.127) (0.112) 
Co-operative Society 0.141 0.113 
 (0.181) (0.175) 
Income generating activities   
Livestock 0.094 0.167 
 (0.094) (0.105) 
Making cloths 0.018 0.077 
 (0.143) (0.139) 
Shops 0.017 0.066 
 (0.129) (0.124) 
Small informal business -0.043 0.023 
 (0.118) (0.135) 
Other activities 0.188 0.250** 
 (0.120) (0.126) 
Year -1.325*** -1.311*** 
 (0.228) (0.236) 
Constant 1.459*** 2.107*** 
 (0.550) (0.614) 
   
R square  0.292 0.283 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  86.94 
Observations 422 422 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Column 1 presents the pooled OLS estimates and Column 2 presents the IV estimates of regression using log of loan amount 
as a dependent variable. We use agriculture as a base group for income generating activity dummies and SKS microfinance as 




Column (1) of Table 6 presents the pooled OLS estimates that shows a positive impact of 
empowerment on the loan amount. In Column (2), after instrumenting for empowerment, the 
estimates show a similar pattern, with IV estimates bigger than the pooled OLS estimates. 
These results, together with the good performance of our instrument in general, suggest that 
more empowered women sustain bigger loans. The IV estimates are considerably larger than 
the pooled OLS estimates, suggesting that the uncorrected OLS model would have 
underestimated the true effect of empowerment on women’s creditworthiness. 
 
We also test for the relevance of the instrument in the first-stage regression. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) proposed a rule of thumb declaring the instruments weak when the first stage F 
statistic is less than 10. The F-statistic from the first-stage is sufficiently large, suggesting that 
our IV is powerful. Another approach, by Stock and Yogo (2005) is to reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments when the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic exceeds a given threshold. 
In our case, we reject the null hypotheses of the weak instrument since Cragg-Donald F statistic 
(86.94) exceeds the threshold of 16.38 at 10%. By these criteria, we have a good instrument in 
the first-born son.  
 
 As an aside issue, we wanted to check which component of the empowerment index 
has bigger effect on the loan amount. For this purpose, as a separate exercised we have 
regressed the loan amounts on the individual components of empowerment, instead of the 
empowerment index (see Table 12 in the Appendix). We find that economic, political and 
interpersonal factors have a positive and significant relationship with loan amount, whereas 
social factors have no effect.  
 
6. North Indian data: Robustness checks and supporting evidence 
 
An important question is: How robust is our empowerment methodology? Can this be 
applied to a larger dataset, and check that the insight we got from our village data tally with 
North India as a whole? To answer these questions, we examine the IHDS data for 2011-12 for 
North India and the rest of India (see Table 9 in the Appendix for summary statistics). The 
IHDS data contain very similar empowerment related information on adult women. Therefore, 




 However, there are two issues. First, the IHDS data contain the credit information at the 
household level, which does not help to identify the female borrowers. Therefore, we create a 
subsample of only female-headed households. Using this subsample, we then create a similar 
empowerment index using PCA (see Table 10 in the Appendix). Since the data also has 
information on women who did not take any loans, we can also estimate the probability of 
getting a loan. Second, IHDS data do not report the birth order of the child. Hence, we cannot 
use the first child’s sex as an IV for empowerment. Instead, we use widowhood as an 
instrument.22 We also use the Heckman two-step procedure to correct for self-selection bias 
(discussed in Appendix B).  
 
Admittedly, the IHDS households are not prima facie comparable with our village survey 
households because IHDS borrowers are head of the household unlike the borrowers in our 
survey data. However, as Table 6 shows, the husband’s income does not affect the wives’ loans. 
Therefore, we can say that there is some similarity between the borrowers of the two datasets 
regarding the responsibility of the loan.  Above all, both samples provide rich information on 
underlying factors of empowerment.   
 
We now need to justify our choice of widowhood as an IV. First, it is a random and 
exogenous event, and it could not possibly have a direct effect on the amount of loans. One 
may argue that a widow would be in greater need of loans than a non-widow female. Based on 
Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) we also know that widows are amongst the most vulnerable 
women in India. However, vulnerability would lead to greater consumption loans, but not non-
consumption loans. But amongst those women who get non-consumption loans, widows are 
likely to be more empowered. Second, the absence of husband allows a woman to be 
independent and to make strategic life choices. For this reason, women who do get bigger loans 
are likely to be more independent and empowered.  
 
In other words, the process of empowerment may be triggered by misfortune and tragedies, 
as it may be with good luck, like giving birth to a son. There is no unique pathway to 
empowerment. Both good and bad lucks can help a woman take the road to empowerment. 
 
The IHDS data contain information on the largest loan which could be of several types of 
                                                 
22 We find widowhood has a positive association with empowerment (see Table 13 and 14 in the Appendix). 
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needs – consumption, production, education, medical, home building/improvement and 
marriage.  From these, we exclude consumption and marriage. Production loans are typically 
short-term working capital credit. Education, home improvement and medical loans are 
somewhat related to production as well, because human capital is an important input for self-
employment and home is also commonly used as a production base. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to include all these loans into a single non-consumption loan.  
   
Table 7 below presents the IV results on the probability of taking any loan. Empowerment 
has a positive effect on the probability only in North India; the rest of India shows no effect. 
The results also suggest that households with better house quality (a proxy for income) are less 
likely to participate in the credit market. Upper caste female-headed households are less likely 
to participate in the credit market in the rest of India while caste does not have any effect in 
North India. Similarly, ration card only affects the probability of participation in the credit 
market in the rest of India. On the other hand, larger (female-headed) households and those 
keeping livestock are more likely to take loans in North India while no effect in the rest of the 
country. The Wald test confirms that the use of IV is justified for North India. However, in the 
rest of India sample, a probit model would have sufficed, although the results did not change.  
 
Table 7: IV estimates for the probability of loan taken based on the IHDS data 
 
 (1) (5) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
Empowerment 0.125* 0.019 
 (0.076) (0.073) 
Education years -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
Age -0.004 -0.010** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Urban area -0.009 0.014 
 (0.140) (0.093) 
Upper Caste -0.186 -0.228*** 
 (0.115) (0.079) 
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Remittance receive from  0.213 -0.021 
non-resident (0.167) (0.126) 
Livestock 0.265** 0.132 
 (0.119) (0.090) 
Size of the household 0.110*** 0.006 
 (0.037) (0.031) 
Land ownership -0.061 0.132 
 (0.124) (0.106) 
Ration Card -0.098 0.346*** 
 (0.147) (0.118) 
House Quality -0.278** 0.443*** 
 (0.114) (0.084) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 0.426 -0.040 
 (0.513) (0.259) 
Allied Agriculture 0.488 -0.595 
 (0.813) (0.540) 
Agriculture wage labour 0.403 0.020 
 (0.527) (0.256) 
Non-agriculture wage  0.361 -0.020 
Labour (0.508) (0.243) 
Petty shop 0.780 -0.074 
 (0.528) (0.266) 
Salaried job 0.295 -0.163 
 (0.506) (0.234) 
Pension or rent 0.275 -0.416 
 (0.515) (0.258) 
Others 0.199 -0.177 
 (0.515) (0.252) 
Constant -0.490 -0.402 
 (0.597) (0.341) 
Observations 736 1478 
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Wald test of exogeneity 4.37** 0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All the variables here are described in Table 
10 in the Appendix. The result from the first stage is in Table 13 in the Appendix. We use professional and organised business 
occupational group as the base group for the occupations dummy. 
 
To address a potential selection bias in the loan amount model, we use the Heckman 
(1979) two-step model that conditions the second stage estimates on the first stage participation 
in the loan market. Table 8 below presents the IV results of the (second stage) effect of 
empowerment on the amount of the loan taken. We find that for one unit increase in the 
empowerment score, the loan amount is expected to increase by 33 percent in North India while 
having no effect in the rest of India. The coefficient of education is positive and significant for 
the rest of India while it shows no effect in North India. Larger households and those which 
receive remittances from a non-resident have a higher loan amount in North India. Loans taken 
from a formal source such as a bank or credit group increases the loan amount in the North and 
the rest of India. Caste does not seem to have any effect on the loan amount.  
 
That empowerment has positive and significant effects in North India directly support our 
village level finding. Empowerment matters for businesses in environments where males are 
in a controlling position23. For the rest of India, where women enjoy much better status, our 
indicators of empowerment (which we identified through our in-person surveys in the North) 
do not capture enough variations in women’s creditworthiness. It is more likely that in the rest 
of India female borrowers may be seen similarly creditworthy as male borrowers. 
Empowerment is of a lesser concern there, instead the borrower’s human capital is much more 
important.  
 
Table 8: IV estimates of loan based on IHDS data 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
Empowerment 0.337** -0.252 
                                                 
23 In Northern India, conservative culture and social norms may discourage women to become economically self-
sufficient (as showed by Ahmed & Sen (2018) in Bangladesh). In this environment, highly empowered women 
who have the capacity to challenge the societal norms are more likely to start businesses, absorb higher credit and 
have a greater control over the business decisions. 
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 (0.146) (0.163) 
Education years -0.00382 0.0745*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0145) 
Age -0.00585 0.0324*** 
 (0.0147) (0.00815) 
Urban -0.212 0.193 
 (0.217) (0.159) 
Upper Caste -0.270 0.181 
 (0.276) (0.194) 
Remittance Received 0.730** 0.141 
 (0.312) (0.222) 
Livestock 0.452 -0.497*** 
 (0.297) (0.158) 
Size of Household 0.202*** -0.0348 
 (0.0589) (0.0557) 
Land Ownership 0.124 -0.0342 
 (0.185) (0.231) 
Source of Loan   
Formal Loan 0.907*** 0.475** 
 (0.330) (0.192) 
Family Loan -0.229 -0.560*** 
 (0.172) (0.146) 
Ration Card 0.0581 -0.485 
 (0.243) (0.284) 
Purpose of Loan   
House Loan 0.258 0.766*** 
 (0.262) (0.167) 
Medical Loan -1.015*** 0.126 
 (0.303) (0.230) 
Education Loan -0.515 0.0654 
 (0.438) (0.238) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 2.378*** 0.163 
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 (0.474) (0.456) 
Allied Agriculture 1.964*** 1.152 
 (0.564) (1.195) 
Agriculture wage labour 2.182*** -0.144 
 (0.559) (0.432) 
Non-agriculture wage labour 1.963*** -0.441 
 (0.474) (0.431) 
Petty shop 3.238*** 0.00622 
 (0.692) (0.426) 
Salaried job 1.365*** -0.0263 
 (0.374) (0.428) 
Pension or rent 1.647*** 0.905* 
 (0.412) (0.508) 
Others 1.581*** -0.0968 
 (0.406) (0.457) 
Mills 3.800*** -2.947*** 
 (1.221) (0.755) 
Constant 3.540*** 11.74*** 
 (1.358) (1.164) 
   
Observations 302 544 
   
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic              132.17 33.691 
R-squared 0.319 0.267 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the variables here are described 
in Table 10 in the Appendix. The results from the first-stage are in Table 14 in the Appendix. We use professional 
and organised business occupational group as the base group for the occupations, dummy for informal loan as the 
base group for the source of loan and dummy for productive loan as the base group of purpose of loan. The F-




7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Using primary data collected from a village in North India over two periods, and the IHDS 
data for all India this paper examines the impact of women’s empowerment on their 
creditworthiness measured in terms of cumulative loan amount taken over time. An index for 
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empowerment was created using four dimensions of empowerment: economic, social, 
interpersonal and political. Although empowerment is an elusive concept and an ideal index is 
beyond the scope of the paper, we took great care (through a detailed questionnaire and in-
person interviews) to capture the critical observable factors underlying empowerment.  
 
Our findings have some policy implications. First, one critical view of microcredit is that 
it does not reach the women who need it most. Our analysis shows that a more empowered 
woman gets more loans, regardless of her family wealth. Therefore, we argue that there is a 
need to decouple empowerment from microcredit either by policies focusing on empowering 
more women or by increasing the access of microcredit to lowly empowered women. 
 
Second, our empowerment index shows that some variables such as women’s economic 
status, their control over savings, political awareness, attitude towards domestic violence and 
purchasing capacity regarding expensive items are more important than other variables in 
determining women’s empowerment. Hence, diverting resources to improve the outcome of 
these variables would increase the empowerment of women. 
 
Third, although we see that giving birth to a son helps a woman to be on track for 
empowerment, by no means we advocate son preference. Instead, we recommend investing in 
resources for promoting gender equality and reducing gender discrimination in jobs, education, 
politics, and sports. Recent progress in education for girls and the government sponsored social 
campaign for promoting gender equity (Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao -- Save a girl child, Educate 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure  1: Timeline of the surveys 
 
Jan 2015                                                                                          
|_________|__________|_________________________________________|__________| 
                  Oct 2015-Dec 2015                                                                                  Dec 2016-Feb 2017                          
                     
                 Collection of the                                                                               Second round 
                   first round 
 
Figure  2: Location of the village 
 





Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in IHDS 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Log of loan Log of the amount of loan 888 10.231 1.437 
Loan taken Dummy if taken any loan 2273 .394 .489 
Loan Amount Loan amount in rupees 2273 30988 167775 
Empowerment Empowerment score 2269 .006 2.254 
Education years Number of education years 
completed 
2273 3.832 4.447 
Age Age 2273 42.864 8.501 
Urban area Dummy if living in urban area 2273 .328 .47 
Upper Caste Dummy if belong to upper caste 2273 .285 .451 
Land owner Dummy if own any land 2273 .317 .465 
Ration Card Dummy if have ration card 2273 .888 .315 
Remittance receive from 
non-resident 
Dummy if any remittance 
received from a non-resident 
2273 .422 .494 
House Quality Dummy for the quality of the 
house (good or bad) 
2273 .650 .477 
Size of the household Number of people living in the 
house 
2273 3.769 1.816 
Livestock Dummy if own any form of 
livestock 
2273 .36 .48 
Widow Dummy if the client is a widow 2273 .577 .494 
Productive loans Dummy if loan taken for 
productive purposes such as 
business or agriculture 
896 .249 .433 
Education Loans Dummy if loan for educational 
purpose 
896 .100 .301 
House Loans Dummy if loan for improving 
the house 
896 .295 .456 
Medical Loans Dummy if loan for medical 
purpose 
896 .345 .476 
Formal loans Dummy if the loan is taken 
from formal source such as 




Informal Loans Dummy if loan from Informal 
sources such as money lenders 
896 .198 .398 
Family Loans Dummy if loan from family and 
friends 
896 .397 .49 
Occupations     
Cultivation  2269 .163 .369 
Allied Agriculture  2269 .005 .073 
Agriculture wage labour  2269 .113 .316 
Non-agriculture wage 
labour 
 2269 .193 .394 
Petty shop  2269 .061 .24 
Salaried job  2269 .246 .431 
Pension or Rent  2269 .094 .292 
Others  2269 .107 .309 
Independent/organized 
business 
 2947 0.02 0.13 
    
    
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of variables used in computing empowerment index for 
IHDS 




Have the most say in cooking 0.891 0.311  0.1271 
Have the most say in purchasing expensive items 0.596 0.491 0.3266 
Have the most say in decision regarding child sickness 0.743 0.437 0.2839 
Have the most say in decision regarding marriage of the 
child 
0.591 0.492 0.3241 
Have the most say in decision regarding work 0.710 0.454 0.1811 
Have the most say in decision when fall sick 0.726 0.446 0.2852 




An empowerment index (similar to the original index) was constructed using the data from 
IHDS as part of robustness check. This index consists of variable capturing various dimensions 
of empowerment such as mobility, participation level in public and political life, purchasing 
capacity, media exposure, family planning and economic status. The first principal component 
explains 33% of the variation in the variables used. 
 





Dummy of first-born son 1.333*** 
 (0.174) 
Education years 0.249*** 
 (0.029) 
Have the most say in decision regarding wedding 
expensive 
0.646 0.478 0.3285 
Can visit health centre without permission 0.362 0.481 0.2751 
Can visit friends without permission 0.384 0.486 0.2614 
Can visit shops without permission 0.417 0.493 0.2395 
Can go short distance without permission 0.308 0.462 0.2857 
Have the most say in number of children to have 0.516 0.500 0.2248 
Have access to media 0.602 0.490 0.0174 
Economic Status (currently working) 0.405 0.491 0.1404 
Member of Mahila Mandal (women group) .0708 0.256 0.0386 
Member of self-help group 0.152 0.359 0.0430 
Member of credit/saving group 0.082 0.274 0.0265 
Member of political organisation 0.009 0.095 0.0319 
Health self-evaluation 0.803 0.336 0.0302 
38 
 
Months with the lender -0.018 
 (0.061) 
Months with the lender square 0.000 
 (0.002) 
Years in the village 0.048*** 
 (0.016) 
No. of working members -0.058 
 (0.221) 
Upper Caste -0.235 
 (0.202) 
House quality 0.317** 
 (0.135) 
Average hours worked per week 0.009 
 (0.006) 
Log of husband’s income 0.368 
 (0.177) 







Co-operative Society 0.255 
 (0.227) 
Income generating activities  
Livestock -0.483*** 
 (0.182) 

















Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 12: Impact of various empowerment components on the loan amount 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Empowerment (Economics, Social,  0.335** 0.957 0.413*** 0.273*** 
Political and Interpersonal) (0.134) (0.676) (0.157) (0.105) 
Education years -0.016 -0.024 -0.049** -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.020) (0.013) 
Months with the lender 0.119*** 0.142*** 0.127*** 0.110*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.035) (0.033) 
Months with the lender square -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village -0.005 -0.032 -0.014* -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of working members 0.020 0.024 0.114** 0.070 
 (0.069) (0.111) (0.057) (0.062) 
Upper Caste 0.149* -0.025 0.157* 0.119 
 (0.084) (0.137) (0.085) (0.073) 
House quality -0.079 -0.098 0.023 -0.024 
 (0.073) (0.100) (0.071) (0.063) 
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Average hours worked per week -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of husband’s income 0.060 0.142 0.162 0.128 
 (0.126) (0.158) (0.115) (0.120) 
Source of the loan     
Utkarash -0.058 -0.149 -0.111 -0.080 
 (0.066) (0.138) (0.077) (0.063) 
Janlaxmi 0.091 0.406* 0.136 0.221** 
 (0.111) (0.232) (0.104) (0.106) 
Traders -0.167 0.241 -0.197 -0.120 
 (0.124) (0.262) (0.129) (0.111) 
Co-operative Society 0.109 0.407 0.020 0.165 
 (0.187) (0.277) (0.193) (0.180) 
Income generating activities     
Livestock 0.082 0.108 0.170 0.165 
 (0.104) (0.165) (0.109) (0.109) 
Making cloths -0.089 0.040 0.013 0.152 
 (0.144) (0.225) (0.144) (0.157) 
Shops -0.045 -0.112 0.107 0.014 
 (0.144) (0.233) (0.132) (0.127) 
Small informal business -0.087 -0.056 0.040 -0.050 
 (0.140) (0.235) (0.146) (0.126) 
Other occupations 0.123 0.084 0.240* 0.278** 
 (0.139) (0.237) (0.127) (0.135) 
Year -1.403*** -1.494*** -1.348*** -1.232*** 
 (0.252) (0.341) (0.244) (0.244) 
Constant 0.624 0.028 0.559 0.809 
 (0.661) (1.182) (0.667) (0.580) 
R-squared 0.277 0.182 0.278 0.274 
     
Observations 422 422 422 422 
          
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Column 1 of Row 1 shows the effect of economic empowerment on loan amount. Column 2 of Row 1 shows the 
effect of social empowerment on loan amount. Column 3 of Row 1 shows the effect of political empowerment on 
loan amount. Column 4 of Row 1 shows the effect of interpersonal empowerment on loan amount. We use 
agriculture as a base group for income generating activity dummies and SKS microfinance as the base group for 
the loan source dummies. 
 
Table 13: Result from the first-stage regression using empowerment as a dependent 
variable in the loan amount model. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Empowerment North India Rest of India 
   
Education years 0.0963*** 0.0239 
 (0.0184) (0.0235) 
Years in place 0.0512*** -0.0163 
 (0.00879) (0.0133) 
Urban area 0.187 0.00977 
 (0.184) (0.245) 
Upper Caste 0.835*** 0.380 
 (0.166) (0.253) 
Remittance receive from -1.235*** -0.752*** 
non-resident (0.172) (0.242) 
Livestock -1.511*** -0.0800 
 (0.173) (0.232) 
Size of HH -0.284*** -0.264*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0536) 
Landowner 0.341** -0.693*** 
 (0.163) (0.264) 
Ration Card 0.272 -0.490 
 (0.198) (0.404) 
Source of loan   
Formal loan -0.331 -0.445* 
 (0.211) (0.265) 
Family loan -0.257 -0.342 
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 (0.165) (0.268) 
Purpose of loan   
House Loan 0.171 0.278 
 (0.202) (0.246) 
Medical Loan -0.386** 0.414 
 (0.191) (0.275) 
Education Loan -0.0111 0.523 
 (0.330) (0.319) 
Occupations   
Cultivation -0.0162 0.941 
 (0.667) (0.627) 
Allied Agriculture -0.0672 1.411 
 (1.030) (1.607) 
Agriculture wage labour -0.455 0.768 
 (0.693) (0.615) 
Non-agriculture wage labour 0.130 0.806 
 (0.666) (0.595) 
Petty shop -2.069*** 0.426 
 (0.678) (0.666) 
Salaried job 0.617 0.471 
 (0.655) (0.593) 
Pension or rent 1.017 0.462 
 (0.681) (0.696) 
Others 1.000 0.366 
 (0.681) (0.655) 
Mills -7.698*** -2.275*** 
 (0.373) (0.682) 
Widow 1.244*** 1.035*** 
 (0.187) (0.240) 
Constant 5.787*** 3.743*** 
 (0.858) (1.057) 
   
Observations 312 564 
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R-squared 0.751 0.221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 shows the estimate from North 
India, Column 2 shows the estimate from rest of India. The results shows that widowhood has a positive 
association with empowerment. We use professional and organised business occupational group as the base group 
for the occupations, dummy for informal loan as the base group for the source of loan and dummy for productive 
loan as the base group of purpose of loan. 
 
 
Table 14: Result from the first-stage regression using empowerment as a dependent 
variable from the selection model. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
WIDOW 1.793*** 1.261*** 
 (0.197) (0.141) 
Education years 0.004 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
Age -0.001 -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Urban area 0.263 0.138 
 (0.188) (0.141) 
Upper Caste -0.078 0.051 
 (0.155) (0.119) 
Remittance receive from  -0.643*** -0.734*** 
non-resident (0.187) (0.142) 
Livestock -0.132 -0.233* 
 (0.164) (0.135) 
Size of the household -0.193*** -0.132*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) 
Land ownership 0.002 -0.451*** 
 (0.170) (0.155) 
Ration Card 0.079 0.104 
 (0.201) (0.173) 
44 
 
House Quality 0.348** -0.122 
 (0.153) (0.127) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 0.172 0.881** 
 (0.686) (0.384) 
Allied Agriculture 0.149 0.030 
 (1.098) (0.786) 
Agriculture wage labour 0.295 0.943** 
 (0.709) (0.379) 
Non-agriculture wage  0.556 0.766** 
Labour (0.677) (0.364) 
Petty shop 0.094 0.710* 
 (0.707) (0.403) 
Salaried job 0.269 0.468 
 (0.677) (0.358) 
Pension or rent 0.057 0.346 
 (0.690) (0.391) 
Others 0.041 0.089 
 (0.689) (0.387) 
Constant -0.966 0.284 
 (0.803) (0.514) 
R-squared   
Observations 736 1,478 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 shows the estimate from North India, and 
Column 2 shows the estimate from rest of India. We use professional and organised business occupational group as the base 
group for the occupations dummy. 
 
Table 15: Fixed effects and random effects model 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE RE 
   
Empowerment 0.262 0.040* 
 (0.164) (0.020) 
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Months with the lender 0.203*** 0.120*** 
 (0.041) (0.027) 
Months with the lender square -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village 0.137 -0.007 
 (0.359) (0.007) 
Average hours worked per  -0.007 0.000 
week (0.008) (0.003) 
Education years  -0.009 
  (0.011) 
No. of working members  0.088 
  (0.067) 
Upper caste  0.107 
  (0.071) 
Utkarash  -0.076 
  (0.074) 
Janlaxmi  0.205* 
  (0.121) 
Traders  -0.142 
  (0.104) 
Co-operative Society  0.165 
  (0.126) 
House quality  -0.002 
  (0.061) 
Income generating activities   
Livestock  0.095 
  (0.099) 
Making cloths  0.008 
  (0.122) 
Shops  0.001 
46 
 
  (0.112) 
Small informal business  -0.051 
  (0.127) 
Other occupations  0.187 
  (0.121) 
year -2.241*** -1.309*** 
 (0.439) (0.144) 
Constant 4,515.143*** 2,639.582*** 
 (881.018) (290.067) 
Breusch and Pagan Test 
 
 1 
Hausman Test 10.21 10.21 
Observations 422 422 
R-squared 0.308  
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is log of loan 
amount. Column 1 shows the fixed effect estimates and column two shows the random effect estimates. 
 
2.9 Appendix B: Identification Strategy for IHDS data 
 
The model consists of the following equations: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 1 �𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏3 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖3 > 0�….. Selection equation (1) 
E𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =   𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏2 +  𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2 …… Empowerment equation (2) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) =  𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏1  +  𝑎𝑎1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖1 ….. Loan amount equation (3) 
 
Loan amount equation is the equation of interest where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is the log of the loan amount 
borrowed by women i. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a potentially endogenous variable, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  represents the vector of 
other control variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is the error term. The second equation is a projection for the 
endogenous variable 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 using 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 as an instrument variable. Selection equation 
estimates the probability of participating in the credit market where 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 equals one if the 




The estimation strategy of this model can be summarized as follows. In Step 1, we estimate the 
likelihood of participating the credit market. In Step 2, we compute the Inverse Mills Ratios 
(IMR) and plug it in the loan amount equation to be estimated by 2SLS along with WIDOW 
as an instrument. The coefficient of IMR is significant for North India and the whole of India 
implying that selection bias is prevalent in the model while, the insignificant coefficient of 
IMR in the rest of India sample suggests that selection bias is not important for this group. 
 
 
 
